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ARTICLES
THE ILLINOIS DEATH PENALTY: WHAT
WENT WRONG?

MARSHALL

J. HARTMAN AND STEPHEN L. RICHARDS*

DEDICATION

This article is dedicated to the memory of Richard E.
Cunningham, a noble warrior and great leader in the battle
against capital punishment.
INTRODUCTION

A citizen of Illinois who had been measured for his coffin and
was within two days of execution is proven innocent of the
murders for which he had been convicted and sentenced to death.
Twelve other men, also convicted and sentenced to death in
Illinois, are similarly exonerated, declared innocent, and set free.
The belief of the complacent in the efficacy of the criminal justice
system is shattered by revelations of police torture, prosecutorial
misconduct, and ineffectiveness of defense counsel. This is Illinois
in the year 2001, and the whole world is watching.
And Illinois is not unique, particularly with respect to the
percentage of reversals and other relief granted to defendants under
a sentence of death. Indeed, according to a recent survey by
Professor James S. Liebman, and his colleagues at Columbia
University, the rate of reversible error for Illinois capital cases from
1973 to 1995 was 66%.1 The national error rate for the comparable
* Marshall Hartman is the Deputy Defender, Capital Litigation Division,

Office of State Appellate Defenders (OSAD). Stephen Richards is the Deputy
Defender, Death Penalty Trial Assistance Division, OSAD.
The Authors wish to acknowledge Steve Clark, Supreme Court Unit,
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Gottfried, State Appellate Defender of Illinois for his continuing support and
vision in suggesting this project.
1. James S. Liebman et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital
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period was 68%. In contrast, the national serious error rate for noncapital cases during the comparable period was 15%.'
Notwithstanding the high serious reversible error rate, the
number of executions in this country has risen sharply over the
years. From 1984 to 1991, an average of fifteen men and women
were executed annually.' Between 1992 and 1994, the number rose
to twenty seven a year, and to fifty three a year from 1994 to 1998. 5
In 1999, the number rose to eighty eight.6
Liebman and his associates reviewed a total of 5,760 capital
cases.7 Of that number, 313 inmates were executed during the
period.8 There were 4,578 state capital convictions of which state
court judges vacated 47% of the death sentences.9 The study also
showed that thereafter federal judges vacated the death sentence in
40% of the remaining cases."° Again, Illinois statistics are consistent
with the rest of the nation. Liebman finds a 43% reversal rate by the
state courts in Illinois death penalty cases, and a 40% reversal rate
of the remaining cases by the federal courts on habeas corpus."
Liebman then combines the overall serious error found by Illinois
state courts on direct appeal, state courts on post-conviction and
federal habeas reversals to reach the total serious error rate in death
penalty cases of 68%.12
It is also interesting to note that of the capital cases reversed
and retried nationally, 82% did not receive the death penalty on
retrial or resentencing, and 7% were found innocent."
Professor Liebman concluded that the two main reasons for the
numerous reversals nationally were "(1) egregiously incompetent
defense lawyers who didn't even look for and demonstrably missed
important evidence that the defendant was innocent or did not
deserve to die; and (2) police or prosecutors who did discover that
kind of evidenced but suppressed it... keeping it from the jury."4
Liebman also reported from a parallel study conducted by the
U.S. Department of Justice, which tracked 263 cases where death
was imposed in 1989." Only 103 of these cases had reached the final
Cases, 1973-1995, 78 TEX. L. REv. 1839, 1854 (2000). See also, infra, chart in
Appendix.
2. Liebman, supra note 1, at 1854.
3. Id.

4. Id. at 1858 n.58.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1858 n.58.
7. Liebman, supra note 1, at 1846.

8.
9.
10.
11.

Id.
Id. at 1847.
Id. at 1849.
Id. at 1849.

12. Liebman, supra note 1, at 1850.

13. Id. at 1852.
14. James S. Liebman, Executive Summary (Source on file with author).
15. Liebman, supra note 1, at 1861.
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disposition stage by 1998.16 Of that number, 76% had been reversed
or remanded for a new sentencing hearing. 7 While Liebman's
research gives a fine overall picture of the number of death penalty
reversals, it does not discriminate as to how many reversals were
due to different types of error. In order to fill this gap, at least for
Illinois, the authors of this article recently undertook a review of
-death penalty reversals in Illinois. The authors have classified
these cases according to the kinds of error that led in each
instance to grants of relief from state and federal reviewing courts
or from the Governor.
It is important to note that for the purpose of this article, the
term "wrongful conviction" means more than the conviction of the
innocent. "Wrongful conviction" means any conviction or sentence
which was obtained wrongfully-obtained, in other words, in
violation of the Illinois or United States Constitution as
interpreted by the Illinois Supreme Court, the federal district
courts in Illinois, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, or the
United States Supreme Court. Any grant of relief in a death
penalty case beyond a limited remand is an official announcement
of a wrongful conviction.
This article will begin with a review of the parameters and
applicable law with respect to the effectiveness of defense counsel
in death penalty cases, prosecutor responsibilities, judicial
obligations, and other questions, including those of fitness and
mental health. We will attempt to categorize the cases in which
relief has been granted in order to discover the general nature of
the problem. Finally, we will comment on some proposed solutions
to the problems identified in our analysis, and offer some
suggestions of our own.
I. PARAMETERS AND PRINCIPLES OF DEATH PENALTY
JURISPRUDENCE: CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE

At the time of the passage of the Eighth Amendment
prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, the death penalty was
a viable sentence in colonial America. From 1791 to date, the
death penalty has been viewed as constitutional and not barred by
the Eighth Amendment. 8 Although in 1972, in Furman v.
Georgia," the method of administering the death penalty was
declared to violate the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the
Eighth Amendment."° By 1976, legislation had seemingly cured

16. Id.
17. Id. at 1861.
18. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972).

19. Id. at 239.
20. Id.

The John Marshall Law Review

[34:409

this problem, and the death penalty was approved once again by
the United States Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia."'
However, continuous attacks have been made on the
constitutionality of the death penalty, particularly in light of the
fact that the Eighth Amendment is a kinetic amendment,
changing with the times. The Eighth Amendment "must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society."2 Nagging questions of the impact
of race as a determinant of who gets the death penalty, statistics
from the rest of the world where the death penalty has been
abolished, international treaties dealing with the rights of both
adults and juveniles that the United States has signed (e.g., the
Vienna Convention), and the increase in the number of states
forbidding execution of the mentally retarded, all place pressure
on those thirty eight states that still retain. death to constantly
review its viability as a fair and meaningful penalty.
II. GROUNDS FOR REVERSAL

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
1. Legal Background
With respect to counsel in death penalty cases, Powell v.
Alabama guaranteed counsel for indigents accused of capital
murder under the due process clause of the 14th Amendment.2
However, it was not until 1963, in Gideon v. Wainwright that
counsel was guaranteed to capital defendants (and all indigent
felons) at trial under the aegis of the Sixth Amendment.24
Counsel was also guaranteed to all indigent felons and capital
litigants at the initial appellate stage if the state had an appellate
procedure for those who could notafford counsel.25 However, with
respect to post-conviction remedies, the United States Constitution
did not guarantee counsel, even in a capital case." In Illinois,
however, the legislature has provided a statutory right to counsel
in capital post-conviction cases, and the United States Congress
has provided for counsel in federal habeas corpus proceedings.27
However, the fact that counsel in post-conviction and habeas
proceedings is a statutory and not a constitutional right resonates
21. 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976).
22. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).

23. 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932).
24. 372 U.S. 335, 342-44 (1963).
25. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963).

26. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989).
27. McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 859 (1994). See also, 725 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/122-4 (West 2000) (granting indigent capital defendants a right to
counsel in post conviction hearings).
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in the question of the standard for ineffectiveness of counsel as a
reason for reversing a conviction or sentence in a capital case. The
standard for ineffectiveness of counsel where such a right arises
under the Sixth Amendment is clearly spelled out by the United
States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington.2 Recently, in
Williams v. Taylor, the United States Supreme Court found that a
defense lawyer had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel
during the sentencing phase of a capital case in violation of
Strickland v. Washington.9 In Williams, the district court had
noted five categories of mitigation not brought out by trial counsel,
a) evidence of Williams' background, b) evidence of abuse by his
father, c) testimony by prison officials that Williams received
commendations for helping to break up a drug ring in prison, and
testimony of correctional officers that he would not be dangerous
in the future, d) prominent character witnesses who would have
testified in his behalf, and e) evidence of petitioner's borderline
mental retardation. 80
However, where the right to counsel is statutory, the
standard for ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel in a capital
case may be only a reasonable level of assistance."' Clearly, where
a lawyer fails to follow the dictates of Supreme Court Rule 651(c),
which requires post-conviction counsel to read the transcript of the
trial, confer with the defendant, and file or amend the postconviction petition in accordance with the defendant's claims of
constitutional violation, that lawyer is ineffective."
Our study found that a significant portion of the grants of
28. 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (holding that counsel's performance must so
undermine the proper functioning of the adversary process that the trial
cannot be relied upon to have produced a just result, and that but for counsel's
errors there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been
different).
29. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 372-73 (2000). See also Strickland,
466 U.S. at 688 (holding that ineffective assistance of counsel exists only when
sufficient prejudice exists to warrant reversal).
30. Williams, 529 U.S. at 372-73.
31. See People v. Cloutier, 732 N.E.2d 519, 527-28 (Ill. 2000).
32. See People v. Johnson, 609 N.E.2d 304, 306 (Ill. 1993). In Johnson, the
defendant was found guilty and sentenced to death for murder, aggravated
kidnapping, deviant sexual assault, and attempt murder. Johnson had filed a
pro-se Post Conviction petition, after which counsel was appointed for him. Id.
However, that lawyer failed to investigate the claims raised in the pro-se
petition, but the circuit court dismissed the petition without a hearing. Id.
On post-conviction appeal, defendant alleged that his post-conviction counsel
failed to follow the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c). Id.
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded to allow the filing of an
amended post-conviction petition. Id. at 314-15. See also People v. Turner, 719
N.E.2d 725, 730 (Ill. 1999) (holding counsel ineffective where post-conviction
counsel met only once with the defendant, never accepted phone calls, failed to
attach affidavits to the post-conviction petition, and failed to file an amended
petition).
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relief involved ineffective assistance of counsel, both in terms of
percentage (19%) and absolute numbers (28)." Excluding for a
moment those cases which involved only limited remands (five
cases),34 Illinois courts have made twenty three findings of
ineffective assistance, eight of which mandated a new trial, 5 and
6
Of the
fifteen of which mandated a new sentencing hearing."
twenty three cases in which trial or sentencing relief was
eventually granted based upon a finding of ineffective assistance,
two involved conflicts of interest,37 four involved failures to
challenge or to appeal critical errors of law or fact, 8 five involved
mistaken concessions or stipulations to guilt, death-eligibility, or
the existence of prior felony convictions, 39 and twelve involved the
33. See, infra, Appendix, pie chart entitled "Error in Illinois Capital Cases."
34. See generally People v. Ruiz, 686 N.E.2d 574 (Ill. 1997); People v.
Orange, 659 N.E.2d 935 (Ill. 1995); People v. Johnson, 609 N.E.2d 304 (Ill.
1993); People v. Caballero, 533 N.E.2d 1089 (Ill. 1989); People v. Ruiz, 547
N.E.2d 170 (Ill. 1989).
35. See generally People v. Steidl, 685 N.E.2d 1335 (Ill. 1997); People v.
Lawson, 644 N.E.2d 1172 (Ill. 1994); People v. Salazar, 643 N.E.2d 698 (Ill.
1994); People v. Thomas, 545 N.E.2d 654 (Ill. 1989); People v. Chandler, 543
N.E.2d 1290 (Ill. 1989); Lewis v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1446 (7th Cir. 1987); People v.
Hattery, 488 N.E.2d 513 (Ill. 1985); People v. Williams, 444 N.E.2d 136 (Ill.
1982).
36. See generally People v. West, 719 N.E.2d 664 (Ill. 1999); United States
v. Gilmore, 35 F. Supp. 2d 626 (N.D. Ill. 1999); People v. Morgan, 719 N.E.2d
681 (Ill. 1999); People v. Towns, 696 N.E.2d 1128 (Ill. 1998); People v. Thomas
(unpublished order of the Circuit Court of Lake County); Hall v. Washington,
106 F.3d 742 (7th Cir. 1997); People v. Howery, 687 N.E.2d 836 (Ill. 1997);
People v. Ruiz, 686 N.E.2d 574 (Ill. 1997); People v. Tye (unpublished order of
the Circuit Court of Cook County); Emerson v. Gramley, 91 F.3d 898 (7th Cir.
1996); People v. Mack, 658 N.E.2d 437 (Ill. 1995); People v. Pugh, 623 N.E.2d
255 (Ill. 1993); People v. Perez, 592 N.E.2d 984 (Ill. 1992); People v. Watkins,
No. 90 CR 27536 (Unpublished order of the Circuit Court of Cook County);
Kubat v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1989).
37. See generally People v. Lawson, 644 N.E.2d 1172 (Ill. 1994) (defense
counsel appeared as prosecutor at defendant's arraignment); People v.
Thomas, 545 N.E.2d 654 (Ill. 1989) (defense counsel also represented a
witness).
38. See generally People v. Salazar, 643 N.E.2d 698 (Ill. 1994) (appellate
counsel failed to challenge voluntary manslaughter jury instructions which
had previously been ruled unconstitutional); People v. West, 719 N.E.2d 664
(Ill. 1999) (appellate counsel failed to challenge finding of death-eligibility
under two-murders eligibility where State failed to prove prior murder was
committed intentionally); People v. Williams, 444 N.E.2d 136 (Ill. 1982)
(defense counsel who failed to make motion to suppress hair evidence and
made numerous other errors of judgment was later disbarred for neglect of
other matters and commingling client funds); People v. Mack, 658 N.E.2d 437
(1995) (appellate counsel failed to challenge fact that jury returned improper
verdict, setting out some but not all elements of eligibility during the
eligibility phase of sentencing).
39. See generally People v. Chandler, 543 N.E.2d 1290 (Ill. 1989) (defense
counsel conceded guilt and asserted nonexistent defense, arguing that
defendant, although guilty of underlying felony, should be acquitted because

20011

The Illinois Death Penalty: What Went Wrong?

failure to investigate
evidence.' °

or

present exculpatory

or mitigating

he did not personally kill the victim); People v. Hattery, 488 N.E.2d 513 (Ill.
1985) (defense counsel presented no defense and conceded defendant's guilt);
People v. Pugh, 623 N.E.2d 255 (Ill. 1993) (defense counsel stipulated that
defendant was eligible for death, not realizing that guilty plea to felony
murder, without proof of intent, could not qualify defendant for death; counsel
also failed to present evidence which would have discredited prosecution's only
eyewitness and tended to show killing was accidental); Lewis v. Lane, 832
F.2d 1446 (7th Cir. 1987); People v. Thomas, (unpublished order of the Circuit
Court of Lake County) (defense counsel was ineffective at sentencing where
there was no proof that defendant intended to kill and he was therefore
improperly found eligible for death).
40. See generally People v. Steidl, 685 N.E.2d 1335 (Ill. 1997) (defense
counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain an expert examination of physical
evidence); People v. Morgan, 719 N.E.2d 681 (Ill. 1999) (defense counsel failed
to present evidence that the defendant's aggressive behavior was attributable
to neurological problems and brain damage); People v. Towns, 696 N.E.2d
1128 (Ill. 1998) (defense counsel was ineffective for failing to present in
mitigation defendant's "pervasive history of child abuse and maltreatment,
coupled with substance abuse and mental illness"); Hall v. Washington, 106
F.3d 742 (7th Cir. 1997) (defense counsel failed to investigate and present
witnesses who would have testified that the defendant saved the life of a child
saved another person from drowning, and helped the victim of an armed
robbery; in addition, counsel gave a closing argument which did not refer to
mitigation and focused solely on the morality of the death penalty); People v.
Howery, 687 N.E.2d 836 (Ill. 1997) (defense counsel at sentencing was
"demoralized" and failed to present available mitigation evidence as to the
defendant's background and good character); People v. Ruiz, 686 N.E.2d 574
(Ill. 1997) (defense failed to present and investigate substantial mitigating
evidence, including evidence of physical abuse, learning disability, and the
involvement of some of defendant's relatives in crime and substance); People v.
Tye (unpublished order of the Circuit Court of Cook County) (defense failed to
present expert testimony as to Tye's mental, psychological, or social history);
Emerson v. Gramley, 91 F.3d 898 (7th Cir. 1996) (defense counsel met only
briefly with defendant, did no investigation, failed to put on mitigation
evidence, and lost the confidence of his client during the trial of his case);
People v. Perez, 592 N.E.2d 984 (Ill. 1992) (defense failed to obtain defendant's
school records, which showed that he had an IQ in the borderline range, failed
to obtain a full mental history of the defendant, and failed fully to investigate
his background); People v. Watkins, No. 90 CR 27536 (Unpublished order of
the Circuit Court of Cook County) (defense counsel failed to present: evidence
of defendant's traumatic childhood and adolescence, which involved severe and
repeated physical and emotional abuse at the hands of a violent, alcoholic
father; evidence of defendant's long history of emotional and psychological
disturbances, which led to multiple suicide attempts by defendant during both
his youth and adulthood; and evidence of defendant's exemplary record of
adjustment to incarceration during the two years he spent in Cook County Jail
awaiting trial and sentencing; in addition, defense counsel had suffered from
serious personal and professional problems that undermined his ability to
represent defendant competently); Kubat v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 351 (7th Cir.
1989) (defense counsel failed to present available mitigating evidence,
including fifteen potential character witnesses; in addition, counsel gave a
rambling and incoherent closing argument which virtually invited the jury to
sentence the defendant to death); United States v. Gilmore, 35 F. Supp. 2d 626
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2. Mitigation and Sentencing

In reviewing the cases reversed or remanded by the Illinois
Supreme Court and the federal courts, the weakest link in
attorney preparation seems to be in the area of mitigation and
sentencing. In case after case, the trial lawyer in a death penalty
case failed to conduct a comprehensive study of the defendant's
background; review available records from hospitals, schools,
Juvenile Court, the military, or prison; or hire appropriate forensic
experts who could provide the sentencer with the total picture of
the defendant, necessary for an informed decision. The classic
example in this field is People v. Perez.'1 Domingo Perez was an
inmate of the Illinois correctional system, and was convicted of the
murder of a fellow inmate."2 In Perez, counsel had asked the
defendant for information about his family and the whereabouts of
mitigation witnesses. ' The defendant refused, and thereafter
counsel failed to conduct any investigation." The Illinois Supreme
Court reversed the trial court's denial of defendant's postconviction petition, vacated the defendant's death sentence, and
remanded for a new sentencing hearing." The court concluded that
counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain the defendant's school
records."' These school records showed that the defendant had an
IQ of between sixty two and seventy seven, which was in the
borderline range for mental retardation.' 7
The court also
concluded that counsel was incompetent for failing to obtain a full
mental history of the defendant, and for failing to obtain more
information about his family background." On remand, the state
did not seek death.
A similar case involving a failure to investigate is People v.
Morgan."' Morgan was charged with murdering two people, as
well as aggravated kidnapping and rape.5" The circuit court found
him guilty, eligible for death, and imposed the death sentence. 1
The defendant filed a post conviction petition, which was
dismissed by the circuit court after a hearing on defendant's
allegation of ineffectiveness of counsel for failure to investigate
and present mitigation and expert testimony on his behalf."2
(N.D. Ill.
1999).
41. 592 N.E.2d 984 (Ill.
1992).

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 985.
Id. at 986.
Id.
Id. at 997.
Perez, 592 N.E.2d at 997.
Id. at 987-88.
Id. at 997.

49. 719 N.E.2d 681 (Ill.
1999).

50. Id. at 687.
51. Id. at 692.
52. Id.
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The Illinois Supreme Court vacated the death sentence and
ordered a new sentencing hearing." The court noted that defense
counsel had been on notice during the trial that there was a
possibility of brain damage, but he failed to obtain medical
records, or to thoroughly investigate Morgan's social and family
history, or hire an expert to examine the defendant.' The court
noted that on post-conviction, the defendant was subjected to
psychological, neuro-psychological, and neurological testing, and a
social worker prepared a mitigation report." The reports indicated
that his aggressive behavior may well have been attributable to
neurological problems and brain damage."
Likewise in People v. Ruiz, Luis Ruiz was convicted of murder
and sentenced to death for his participation in a "gangland"
slaying of three teenagers. 7 Thereafter, his conviction and
sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, but the defendant filed a
post-conviction petition, which was denied by the circuit court."'
However, on appeal the Illinois Supreme Court remanded the case
for reassignment to a different judge." He was again denied relief
without an evidentiary hearing, but on appeal the Illinois
Supreme Court remanded the case back to the circuit court for a
hearing on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel at
sentencing.°
After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the
defendant's post-conviction petition alleging ineffective assistance
of counsel for failing to investigate and present substantial
mitigating evidence, including evidence of physical abuse, learning
disability, and the involvement of some of defendant's relatives in
crime and substance abuse."' The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed
the trial court's grant of the petition and remanded for
resentencing 6
Another case on point is Hall v. Washington.6 The defendant,
Anthony Hall, was convicted of the murder of a food service worker
in the prison, and sentenced to death.' He appealed, but all
Illinois courts affirmed his conviction and sentence, both on direct
appeal, and on post-conviction review.6 Thereafter, he filed for a
53. Id. at 712.
54. Morgan, 719 N.E.2d at 711-12.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 694-96.
Id. at 711.
686 N.E.2d 574, 575 (Ill. 1997).
Id. at 576.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 582.
Ruiz, 686 N.E.2d at 584.
106 F.3d 742 (7th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 744.
Id.
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writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court.66 That too was
denied. 7 On appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, that
court granted the writ with respect to sentencing, based on
ineffective assistance of counsel."
The Seventh Circuit held that defense counsel failed to
investigate and present mitigating evidence such as three
witnesses who would have testified to separate incidents where
Anthony Hall saved the lives of three people, a child, a woman who
was drowning, and a victim of an armed robbery.69 In addition, in
closing argument his trial lawyer focused on the morality of the
death penalty instead of mitigation for the client.0
In People v. Towns, a jury convicted Towns of murdering a
convenience store clerk in Fairview Heights, Illinois. 7' The jury
also found him eligible for the death penalty on the basis that he
had committed the murder in the course of an armed robbery, and73
voted for death. 72 The defendant filed for post-conviction relief.

Among his allegations was a claim of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel at the capital sentencing hearing.74 Post-conviction
counsel attached an affidavit to the record from a social worker
and mitigation specialist detailing Towns' "pervasive history of
child abuse and maltreatment, coupled with substance abuse and
mental illness," which evidence was not presented to his
sentencing jury. 7 Towns' petition was dismissed by the circuit
court without hearing, but on appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court
reversed and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on the
issue of ineffectiveness of counsel at sentencing. 6 Thereafter, the
circuit court held an evidentiary hearing and ordered a new
sentencing hearing.
Another example of a case where a defendant might have
been executed due to the ineffectiveness of trial counsel in the
sentencing stage is the case of People v. Tye. 77 Jimmy Tye was
charged with the murder of his three-year-old daughter by beating
her with an electrical cord to punish her.76 He was convicted and
sentenced to death by the Circuit Court of Cook County in a bench

66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Hall, 106 F.3d at 744.

69. Id. at 752.
70. Id. at 750.
71. 696 N.E.2d 1128, 1130 (Ill.
1998).

72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1132.
1131.
1133.
1136.

76. Towns, 696 N.E.2d at 1143.
77. 565 N.E.2d 931 (Ill.
1990).

78. Id. at 934.
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On appeal, The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed his
trial.8
conviction and sentence. ° However, three Justices dissented from
the necessity to impose death in this case.8 The three dissenting
judges pointed out that he had no prior record, was the father of
six children, with no prior history of beatings.82 The defendant
then filed a post-conviction petition in the circuit court, alleging
ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to investigate
either guilt-innocence claims or present expert testimony as to
Tye's mental, psychological, or social history. The circuit court
vacated his death sentence and ordered a new sentencing hearing,
after which Tye received a sentence of no-death 3
3.

Guilt/Innocence & Eligibility Phases

In addition to failure to investigate the social history and
family background of defendants, criminal defense lawyers have
provided ineffective representation in the guilt-innocence stage as
well. The Illinois Supreme Court has determined that there were
cases where defense counsel simply did not know the law. In
others, defense counsel stipulated to the guilt of the defendant or
actually told the jury in so many words that the defendant was
guilty.
In People v. Williams, the case was reversed because of
ineffectiveness of counsel in that counsel was under disciplinary
proceedings.' The defendant, Dennis Williams was convicted of
two counts of murder, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and
rape.85 Williams and his co-defendants in this case became widely
known as the "Ford Heights Four." Williams was sentenced to
death.86 Initially the Illinois Supreme Court rejected Williams'
appeal in which he claimed ineffective assistance of his trial

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 947-50.
82. Tye, 565 N.E.2d at 947.
83. See also People v. Orange, 521 N.E.2d 69 (Ill. 1988) (trial counsel failed
to investigate and present possible mitigation, including evidence from friends
and employers); People v. Caballero, 464 N.E.2d 223 (Ill. 1984) (defense

counsel failed to put on mitigation witnesses who would have testified to the
defendant's good qualities and the weakness and recency of his ties to gangs);
Kubat v. Theiret, 867 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1989) (reversing conviction because
counsel failed to present available mitigating evidence, including 15 potential
character witnesses); People v. Watkins, 688 N.E.2d 798 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998),

(original trial counsel failed to investigate and present available mitigating
evidence

regarding

traumatic

childhood,

emotional

and

psychological

disturbances, and an exemplary record of adjustment in prison); and People v.
Steidl, 568 N.E.2d 837 (Ill. 1991) (counsel failed to obtain expert examination
of physical evidence and failed to present any mitigating evidence).
84. 444 N.E.2d 136, 137 (1982).

85. Id.
86. Id.
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counsel. 7 The trial lawyer had represented three of the defendants
in this case. 8 Simultaneously, the attorney was neglecting legal
matters, converting clients' funds and committing acts prejudicial
to the administration of justice. 9 However, while Williams'
request for a rehearing was pending, the court heard arguments
on the disciplinary case against defendant's trial attorney."' The
court allowed the petition for rehearing, then reversed and
remanded the case for a new trial." On retrial, Williams was
convicted again and given the death penalty, which was again
affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court. 2 Thereafter, DNA
evidence proved that he was innocent and he was acquitted of all
charges.
In addition, several cases have been reversed where the court
found that defense counsel had a conflict of interest. In People v.
Lawson, defense counsel appeared at the defendant's arraignment
as the prosecuting assistant State's Attorney. 3 The Illinois
Supreme Court found a conflict of interest. 4 In People v. Thomas,
the court also found a conflict of interest when defense counsel
simultaneously represented both the defendant and a state
witness.
In People v. Thomas, Christopher Thomas Was accused of the
murder of a delivery driver in the course of a felony (burglary and
robbery). 6 He was convicted by a jury, and sentenced to death by
the Court in Lake County. 7 The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed
the decision. 8 Thereafter, the defendant filed a post-conviction
petition in the circuit court.
Among other allegations, the
defendant argued ineffectiveness of trial counsel, and that
privileged mental health records were improperly introduced
against him at the eligibility stage, contrary to Illinois law°0 In
addition, the defendant argued that being convicted of felony
murder in and of itself, absent proof of intent to kill, was an
insufficient prerequisite for the death penalty.'
The Circuit
Court of Lake County vacated the death penalty, and resentenced

87. Id.
88. Id. at 137.
89. Williams, 444 N.E.2d at 138.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 137.
Id. at 143.
People v. Williams, 588 N.E.2d 983, 988 (Ill.
1991).
644 N.E.2d 1172, 1185 (Ill.
1994).
Id. at 1186.
545 N.E.2d 654, 658 (Ill.
1989).

96. 687 N.E.2d 892, 895 (Ill.
1997).

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Id. at 910.
Id. at 907.
Id. at 989.
Thomas, 687 N.E.2d at 989.
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the defendant to a term of years."'
4. Appellate Counsel
Post conviction proceedings may also be utilized in Illinois to
give relief to a death row inmate where his appellate counsel was
ineffective as well. In the case of People v. West, the Illinois
Supreme
affirmed Paul West's conviction and death
sentence."' 3 Court
The defendant then filed a post-conviction petition,
which was dismissed without hearing by the circuit court.'0 ' The
Illinois Supreme Court reversed the dismissal by the circuit court
and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing.'
The
Illinois Supreme Court held that under the Illinois death penalty
statute, the defendant would be eligible for the death penalty if he
had intentionally committed two murders. 6 West had plead
guilty to a prior murder, which the State had introduced as the
basis for his eligibility for the death penalty in the case at bar.' 7
However, the Supreme Court held that the State failed to prove
that the prior murder was committed intentionally° 8 Therefore,
he was ineligible for the death penalty in the present case.'9
Moreover, since his eligibility to receive the death sentence in the
trial at bar was not established, the constitutional prohibition
against double jeopardy barred the State from seeking the death
penalty again."' Therefore, West could only be sentenced to a

102. See also People v. Chandler, 543 N.E.2d 1290, 1292 (Ill. 1989) (where
defense counsel conceded guilt and asserted a nonexistent defense when he
argued that the Defendant, although guilty of the underlying felony, should be
acquitted because he did not personally kill the victim); People v. Hattery, 488
N.E.2d 513, 516 (Ill. 1985) (where counsel presented no defense and conceded
client's guilt); People v. Pugh, 623 N.E.2d 255, 257 (Ill. 1995) (where defense

counsel stipulated that the Defendant was eligible for death, not realizing that
a guilty plea to felony murder alone could not qualify the Defendant for death;
he also failed to present evidence which would have discredited the
prosecution's only eyewitness and shown that the killing was accidental);
People v. Lewis, 473 N.E.2d 901, 912 (Ill. 1984) (defense counsel mistakenly

stipulated during sentencing that the client had four felony convictions when
in fact one felony charge had been dismissed, and another reduced to a
misdemeanor). Of course, in Lewis, the prosecution was equally culpable, if
not more so, because when an assistant state's attorney and an assistant
attorney general discovered the error, they did not tell the defense or the
court. The death sentence was finally vacated by the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals. Lewis v. Lane 832 F.2d 1446, 1465 (7th Cir. 1987).
103. 719 N.E.2d 664, 668 (1999).

104. Id.
105. Id. at 681.

106. Id. at 680.
107. Id.
108. West, 719 N.E.2d at 680.

109. Id.
110. Id.
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Since West's
penalty less than death upon resentencing."'
appellate lawyer failed to raise that issue on direct appeal, the
Illinois Supreme Court held that West was deprived of the
effective assistance of counsel on appeal.112
Likewise, in People v. Mack, Larry Mack was accused of the
murder of a bank security guard and armed robbery, and convicted
by the Circuit Court of Cook County." 3 Thereafter, the jury
sentenced him to death, and the Illinois Supreme Court
review,
Mack argued
On post-conviction
affirmed."'
ineffectiveness of appellate counsel for not bringing to the court's
attention that the verdict returned by the jury during the
sentencing phase was improper."' The jury found that the murder
was committed in the course of an armed robbery, but omitted
reference to his mental state at the time." 6 Specifically, the jury
failed to find that he had committed the acts with the intent to kill
or knowing that his acts would create great bodily harm."7 The
post-conviction court vacated the death penalty, and ordered a new
The State appealed, but the Illinois
sentencing hearing."8
Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order of a new
sentencing hearing."'
B. ProsecutorialMisconduct
1.

Legal Background

It has long been recognized that the responsibility of insuring
that a criminal defendant receives a fair trial lies, in heavy
measure, upon the prosecutor. As Justice Abe Fortas observed in
Giles v. Maryland, "a criminal trial is not a game in which the
State's function is to outwit and entrap its quarry. The State's
pursuit is justice, not a victim.""'
In particular, the prosecutor has special responsibilities in
discovery. A prosecutor must give to the defense all material
exculpatory evidence in his own possession or in the possession of
the police, and he must do so even in the absence of a specific
request by the defense."' A prosecutor is allowed to promise
111. Id. See also People v. Salazar, 643 N.E.2d 698, 707-08 (Ill. 1994)
(appellate counsel failed to challenge involuntary manslaughter jury
instructions that had previously been ruled unconstitutional).
112. West, 719 N.E.2d at 680.
113. See generally People v. Mack, 695 N.E.2d 869 (Ill. 1998).
114. Id. at 870.

115. Id. at 871.
116. Id.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Mack, 695 N.E.2d at 872-73.
Id.
386 U.S. 66, 96 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring).
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 454 (1995); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
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leniency to a state witness in return for "truthful testimony," but
must disclose the terms of any agreement to defense counsel and
to the court. 122 Moreover, if a state witness testifies falsely on the
stand that there was no offer of leniency or misrepresents the
terms of the offer, the prosecutor
is required to notify the court
13
that this witness is lying.
Given the clear limits upon the prosecutor's authority, it is
particularly distressing that so many of the Illinois death penalty
reversals have been based, in whole, or in part, on prosecutorial
misconduct. Our survey reveals that of all reversals, prosecutorial
misconduct accounted for 21%, or just over one fifth."2
The
category was the second most important, ranking behind judicial
error (50%) and just ahead of error by defense counsel (19%)."'
The absolute number of prosecutorial reversals was also quite
significant: 30 total reversals, 13 resulting in new trials,7 6 and 17
resulting in new sentences or new sentencing hearings.
Common forms of misconduct included: (1) discrimination8
against African Americans or women in jury selection (2 cases);"
(2) pursuit of a death sentence after promising or agreeing that
death was not appropriate (2 cases); 129 (3) attacks on the integrity
of counsel or defense witnesses (4 cases); 30 (4) use of inadmissible
83, 91 (1963).
122. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 155 (1972).
123. Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 29 (1957).
124. See infra, Appendix, pie chart entitled "Error in Illinois Capital Cases."
125. Id.
126. These are: People v. Blue, 724 N.E.2d 920 (Ill. 2000); People v.
Williams, 695 N.E.2d 380 (Ill. 1998); People v. Blackwell, 665 N.E.2d 338 (Ill.
1996); People v. Jimerson, 652 N.E.2d 278 (Ill. 1995); People v. Hope, 589
N.E.2d 503 (Ill. 1992); People v. Kidd, 591 N.E.2d 431 (Ill. 1992); People v.
Enis, 564 N.E.2d 1155 (Ill. 1990); People v. Cruz, 521 N.E.2d 18 (Ill. 1988);
People v. Hernandez, 521 N.E.2d 18 (Ill. 1988); People v. Johnson, 506 N.E.2d
563 (Ill. 1987); People v. Hope, 508 N.E.2d 202 (Ill. 1986); People v. Bean, 485
N.E.2d 349 (Ill. 1985); and People v. Emerson, 455 N.E.2d 41 (Ill. 1983).
127. These are: People v. Woolley, 687 N.E.2d 979 (Ill. 1999); People v.
Mulero, 680 N.E.2d 1329 (Ill. 1997); People v. Williams, 641 N.E.2d 296 (Ill.
1994); People v. Hooper, 552 N.E.2d 684 (Ill. 1989); People v. Harris, 547
N.E.2d 1241 (Ill. 1989); People v. Gacho, 522 N.E.2d 1146 (Ill. 1988); People v.
Adams, 485 N.E.2d 339 (Ill. 1985); People v. Lyles, 478 N.E.2d 291 (Ill. 1985);
People v. Brisbon, 478 N.E.2d 402 (Ill. 1985); People v. Ramirez, 457 N.E.2d
31 (Ill. 1983); People v. Holman, 469 N.E.2d 119 (Ill. 1984); People v. Yates,
456 N.E.2d 1369 (Ill. 1983); People v. Davis, 452 N.E.2d 525 (1983); People v.
Brownell, 449 N.E.2d 1318 (Ill. 1983); People v. Szabo, 447 N.E.2d 193 (Ill.
1983); People v. Walker, 440 N.E.2d 83 (Ill. 1982); and People v. Walker, 419
N.E.2d 1167 (Ill. 1981).
128. People v. Blackwell, 665 N.E.2d 338 (Ill. 1996); People v. Hope, 589
N.E.2d 503 (Ill. 1992).
129. People v. Brownell, 449 N.E.2d 1318 (Ill. 1983); People v. Walker, Jr.,
419 N.E.2d 1167 (Ill. 1981).
130. People v. Kidd, 591 N.E.2d 431, 434 (Ill. 1992) (in a case involving arson
and murder, the prosecutor repeatedly characterized defense counsel's
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evidence or misuse of evidence properly admitted for a limited
purpose (9 cases);... (5) invalid appeals to emotion or prejudice (9
cases);... and (6) knowing use of false or misleading evidence (4
arguments as a "smokescreen"); People v. Bean, 485 N.E.2d 349, 359 (Ill. 1985)
(prosecutor unfairly argued that defense counsel's attacks on a codefendant
were a subterfuge designed to create reversible error); People v. Emerson, 455
N.E.2d 41, 45 (Ill. 1983) (prosecutor accused defense counsel of trying to "lay a
smokescreen" and "dirty up the victim," as defense attorneys always do;
prosecutor also said to jury: "we can't tell you everything he did after his
arrest and he knows it. Maybe when this is over I will tell you... "); People v.
Lyles, 478 N.E.2d 291, 301 (Ill. 1985) (prosecutor personally attacked the
defense psychiatrist, calling him a liar, a fraud, and a prostitute).
131. People v. Enis, 564 N.E.2d 1155 (Ill. 1990) (prosecutor improperly crossexamined defendant about a prior criminal sexual assault charge, using
hearsay statements and failing to prove up the misconduct he had implied);
People v. Hernandez, 521 N.E.2d 25 (Ill. 1988) (after a codefendant's hearsay
statement had been improperly admitted without sufficient redaction to
eliminate references to the defendant, the prosecutor repeatedly referred to
the phrase "friends" contained in the statement in order to alert the jury that
the defendant had been implicated); People v. Johnson, 506 N.E.2d 563 (1987)
(prosecutor introduced out-of-court statements made by the codefendant and
then used them in closing argument); People v. Mulero, 680 N.E.2d 1329 (Ill.
1997) (prosecutor used defendant's properly filed motion to suppress her
confession to cross-examine her at sentencing to show lack of remorse); People
v. Harris, 547 N.E.2d 1241 (Ill. 1989); People v. Blue, 724 N.E.2d 920 (Ill.
2000) (prosecutor used the admission of a slain officer's oath of service and the
placement of his "star" at police headquarters to argue that the jury should
send a message to all police officers "[firom the superintendent down to the
newest rookie," that they were grateful for their service; prosecutor also
improperly cross-examined defense witness using spurious testimonial
objections and personal comments on the witness's credibility); People v.
Williams, 695 N.E.2d 380 (Ill. 1998) (after procedurally maneuvering to ensure
that defendant was tried together with his codefendant, prosecutor used
inadequately redacted statements of codefendant to argue that defendant was
guilty); People v. Szabo, 447 N.E.2d 193 (Ill. 1983) (prosecutor cross-examined
defendant about why he remained silent after his arrest and argued during
closing argument that the lack of a death penalty had led to an increase in
crime); People v. Cruz, 521 N.E.2d 18 (Ill. 1988) (prosecutor deliberately
introduced evidence which would encourage jury to believe that the
codefendant's redacted statement referred to the defendant and then
improperly urged the jury to consider the codefendant's statement against the
defendant).
132. People v. Brisbon, 478 N.E.2d 402 (Ill. 1985) (prosecutor argued that
defendant could be released on parole in eleven years and that statistics he
had read indicated that murder rate increased during period when death
penalty ruled unconstitutional); People v. Holman, 469 N.E.2d 119 (Ill. 1984)
(prosecutor argued: that if defendant was not sentenced to death, he would
escape and kill guards and other people; the victim was an honor student; the
victim's mother had "moral fiber"; death is the appropriate penalty for all
homicides except voluntary manslaughter; he personally believed in the death
penalty); People v. Walker, 440 N.E.2d 83 (Ill. 1982) (prosecutor argued that
defendant might be released on parole); People v. Hope, Jr., 508 N.E.2d 202
(Ill. 1986) (prosecutor introduced evidence of victim's surviving family at trial
and then argued that the jury should convict the defendant because the
victim's spouse did not know that was the last time she would see the victim);
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cases)."'
2. Failureto Disclose
In People v. Jimerson, Jimerson and three others were convicted and
sentenced to death in Cook County for the murder of Larry Lionberg and the
murder and rape of Carol Schmal.1 4 On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court
initially affirmed his convictions. Thereafter, he filed a post-conviction
petition, alleging that the State had promised leniency to a state witness in
return for her testimony, without informing the defense or the court of that
fact. 35 Moreover, the witness testified that she had not been promised
anything in exchange for her1 37testimony. 3 6 The petition was dismissed
without an evidentiary hearing.

The Illinois Supreme Court reversed on appeal, holding that the State
was required to correct the perjured testimony of the state witness at trial. 38
The court ordered a new trial,139 after which Jimerson was exonerated of all
charges.
In People v. Olinger, Perry Olinger and an accomplice were found

People v. Davis, 452 N.E.2d 525 (Ill. 1983) (prosecutor, during eligibility
phase, informed jury that defendant was under sentence of death for another
murder; and that victim's wife gave birth one day after victim killed); People v.
Ramirez, 457 N.E.2d 31 (Ill. 1983) (prosecutor: called widow of victim to stand
during eligibility hearing; commented on defendant's decision not to take
stand at hearing; argued that victim's status as police officer was factor in
deciding whether to impose death); People v. Williams, 641 N.E.2d 296 (Ill.
1994) (prosecutor introduced eight foot chart detailing defendant's misconduct
and used police officer to help display the chart to the jury during sentencing;
prosecutor also argued that defendant's plea bargain to prior manslaughter
conviction was a sham); People v. Hooper, 552 N.E.2d 684 (Ill. 1989)
(prosecutor commented at sentencing that defendant might kill a guard or
prison chaplin in jail and that if the jurors failed to sentence the defendant to
death they would be lying "to the judge and to God"); People v. Yates, 456
N.E.2d 1369 (Ill. 1983) (prosecutor argued that jurors should not worry if they
convicted the wrong person because the prosecutor "will take the risk"; and he
had never sought death penalty before but this was the worst crime he could
think of, and it merited death).
133. People v. Jimerson, 652 N.E.2d 278 (Ill. 1995) (prosecutor knowingly
presented perjured testimony of witness who testified that she had not been
promised anything in return for that testimony); People v. Woolley, 687
N.E.2d 979 (Ill. 1999) (prosecutor in closing argument knowingly
mischaracterized defendant's misdemeanor convictions as felonies); People v.
Gacho, 522 N.E.2d 1146 (Ill. 1988) (prosecutor argued at sentencing that
defendant, who could only receive death or life without parole, might get out
like "Richard Speck" and "hurt someone else"); People v. Adams, 485 N.E.2d
339 (Ill. 1985).
134. 652 N.E.2d 278, 280 (Ill. 1995).
135. Id. at 286-88.
136. Id. at 284.
137. Id. at 279.
138. Jimerson, 652 N.E.2d at 288.
139. Id.
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guilty of the murders of three people. 140 The defendant's conviction and
sentence of death were affirmed on direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme
Court. 4' Thereafter, the defendant filed a post-conviction petition, alleging
that the prosecutors had failed to disclose the full extent of a "deal" that had
been offered to a state witness in return for his testimony, and that the
prosecutor at trial knowingly used the perjured testimony of that witness to
142
obtain the conviction . The trial court dismissed Olinger's petition, without
holding an evidentiary hearing, even though there were allegations that the
witness had not disclosed that prosecutors in other states were also going to
drop charges against him if he testified as a state witness in Illinois, and that
the Illinois prosecutor had brokered this leniency.143 The Illinois Supreme
Court remanded the case back to the trial court for a full evidentiary hearing
on defendant's claims of prosecutorial misconduct and perjury.14
Unfortunately, Olinger died in prison before the evidentiary hearing took
place.
3. ImproperArgument
Another example of prosecutorial misconduct held by the
Illinois Supreme Court to require reversal is People v. Gacho.4'
The defendant's convictions for multiple murders were affirmed,
but the Illinois Supreme Court vacated his death sentence and
remanded for a new sentencing hearing because: (1) the prosecutor
argued that the defendant, who could only be sentenced to death
or natural life without the possibility of parole, might, like
"Richard Speck," get out on parole and "hurt someone else," and
(2) the trial judge had refused to instruct the jury that the
defendant, if not sentenced to death, would serve a term of natural
life without the possibility of parole. 46 On remand, the defendant
received a sentence of natural life in prison.
In People v. Emerson, after Dennis Emerson was convicted of
murder and sentenced to death, the Illinois Supreme Court
reversed on the ground that the prosecutor's numerous improper
statements during closing argument had deprived the defendant of
The court held that the following comments of the
a fair trial.'
prosecutor were prejudicial: (1) the argument that: "we can't tell
you everything he did after his arrest and he knows it. Maybe
when this is over I will tell you what he did when he was
arrested," 4 ' and (2) the argument that defense counsel, like all

140. 680 N.E.2d 321, 325 (Ill. 1997).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 329-30.

143. Id. at 330-31.
144. Id. at 331.

145. 522 N.E.2d 1146 (Ill. 1988).
146. Id. at 1162-63, 1165-66.
147. 455 N.E.2d 41, 47 (Ill. 1983).

148. Id. at 45.
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defense attorneys, was trying to "lay a smokescreen," and "dirty up
the victim." " 9 On remand, the defendant was again convicted and
sentenced to death.15 ° This case is currently on post conviction
review.
In the case of People v. Mulero, the defendant's conviction was
affirmed, but her death sentence was vacated and the case
remanded for a new sentencing hearing because the prosecutor
improperly used the defendant's motion to suppress her confession
to cross-examine her at the death penalty hearing, attempting to
show that this demonstrated lack of remorse.15' On remand, the
defendant was sentenced to serve natural life in prison.
In People v. Blue, Murray Blue was convicted of the murder of
a police officer and sentenced to death. 5' The Illinois Supreme
Court reversed the defendant's conviction and remanded the case
for a new trial because of the cumulative effect of prosecutorial
misconduct in combination with several erroneous rulings by the
trial court."' The court found that the trial court had erred by
allowing the admission into evidence and submission to the jury
during deliberations of the victim's blood and brain spattered
uniform shirt mounted on a headless mannequin."' This error was
further exacerbated by the prosecution's numerous prejudicial
statements during the guilt-innocence phase, including: (1) telling
the jury that the victim's family needed to "hear" from them; and
(2) saying that jury should send a message to all police officers
from the "superintendent to the newest rookie, "that they were
grateful for their service."' The trial court, at the behest of the
prosecution, mistakenly allowed the prosecution to introduce
evidence of the victim's oath of service and the fact that his "star"
had been given a place of honor at police headquarters." '
Moreover, the prosecutors violated the advocate-witness rule by
repeatedly interrupting a witness they had interviewed before
trial with spurious 157
testimonial objections and comments on the
witness's credibility.
Speaking for the court, Justice Heiple found that the
prosecutor's strategic choices, combined with their improper
conduct and the judge's mistaken rulings had a "synergistic effect,"
reflecting "an intent by the State to place the jury's responsibility
as citizens on trial, as much as the State placed defendant on

149. Id.

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

People v. Emerson, 522 N.E.2d 1109, 1110 (Ill.
1987).
680 N.E.2d 1329, 1336 (Ill. 1997).
People v. Blue, 724 N.E.2d 920, 921 (Ill. 2000).
Id. at 940.
Id. at 938.
Id. at 937.
Id. at 938.

157. Blue, 724 N.E.2d at 940.
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trial.1 58 The court also noted that the prosecutors and defense
counsel had both engaged in numerous other instances of improper
conduct, which included, on the part of the prosecutors, harassing
and shouting at a defense witness, throwing photographic exhibits
onto a table in front of defense counsel, and insulting one of
The Illinois
defendant's attorneys in the judge's chambers. 9
Supreme Court admonished both sides not to repeat this
"infantile" conduct upon retrial. 61 On remand, the defendant was

convicted again, but did not receive the death penalty.1 '

C. Actual Innocence: DNA, Witness Recantation, & Other Special
Circumstances
In some cases, wrongful convictions of defendants under
sentence of death were established by circumstances other than
ineffectiveness of defense counsel or prosecutorial misconduct. In
fact, au contrare, it was the persistence of defense counsel and the
cooperation of the state which assisted in the exoneration of the

158. Id. at 941.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 942.
161. See also People v. Kidd, 675 N.E.2d 910 (Ill. 1996) (holding that
prosecutor's repeated and prejudicial attacks on counsel's strategies as a
"smokescreen" designed to confuse jurors were inflammatory); People v. Bean,
485 N.E.2d 349 (Ill. 1985) (the prosecutor argued that the codefendant's
attorney's attacks on the Defendant were subterfuges designed to create
reversible error); People v. Lyles, 478 N.E.2d 291 (Ill. 1985) (the prosecutor
attacked the defense psychiatrist by calling her a liar, a fraud, and a
prostitute).
Other examples of prosecutor misconduct include: People v. Enis, 564
N.E.2d 1155 (Ill. 1990) (the prosecutor cross-examined the defendant about a
prior charge of rape using hearsay statements, without later proving it up
with live witnesses); People v. Szabo, 708 N.E.2d 1096 (Ill. 1988) (the State's
Attorney cross-examined John Szabo about why he remained silent after
arrest); People v. Ramirez, 500 N.E.2d 14 (Ill. 1986) (called widow of the
victim to the stand during the eligibility hearing, commented on Ramirez's
decision not to testify at the hearing; and argued that the victim's status as
police officer was a factor in deciding whether to impose death); People v.
Woolley, 687 N.E.2d 979 (Ill. 1999) (mischaracterized the defendant's
misdemeanor convictions as felonies when arguing during sentencing); People
v. Hooper, 665 N.E.2d 1190 (1996) (commented at sentencing that the
defendant might kill a guard or prison chaplin in jail and that not sentencing
Murray Hooper to death would be a lie "to the judge and to God"); People v.
Holman, No. 85897, 2000 Ill. Lexis 782 (Ill. May 30, 2000) (argued that if not
sentenced to death Holman would escape, kill guards and other people, that
the victim was an honor student and that death was appropriate for all
homicides except for voluntary manslaughter, and the prosecutor personally
believed in the death penalty); People v. Yates, 456 N.E.2d 1369 (Ill. 1983)
(the prosecutor argued that jurors should not worry if they convicted the
wrong person, the prosecutor "will take the risk"; that he had never sought
death before, but this was the worst crime he could think of, and it merited the
death penalty).
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defendant.
In People v. Jones, the defense counsel never gave up in his
efforts to prove Ronald Jones' innocence.'62 The defendant was
convicted of murder and aggravated sexual assault of a south side
woman in 1985.163 He was sentenced to death.'
The Illinois
Supreme Court, despite defendant's claim of innocence, affirmed
the convictions and sentence.'
The defendant then filed a post-conviction petition, charging
that the police beat him into a confession, and he requested DNA
testing to establish his innocence.'66 The trial Judge stated on the
record: "What issue could possibly be resolved by DNA testing?" 7
Jones was exonerated after DNA testing was done, and the Cook
County State's Attorney's office agreed to vacate his conviction and
drop all charges against him in the light of that definitive
evidence.
In People v. Burrows, Burrows was convicted of murder and
armed robbery, and sentenced to death by a jury.'68 At trial no
physical evidence linked him to the crime, however, two codefendants testified against him." 9 Both of these co-defendants
later recanted their testimony, and stated that Burrows was
innocent. 70 One of these co-defendants testified on post conviction
that she alone had committed the murder. 17 In addition, physical
evidence and another witness corroborated her testimony.17' The
Illinois Supreme Court remanded
for a new trial, and Burrows
173
was subsequently set free.

Another case in which the defendant was found to be
absolutely innocent was People v. Porter.'74 In Porter, the
defendant, Anthony Porter was accused of shooting two people in a
Chicago park.'75 After conviction and a sentence of death, the
defendant filed a post-conviction petition arguing that his trial
lawyer had failed to thoroughly investigate the case, and that one

162. See generally People v. Jones, 620 N.E.2d 325 (Ill. 1993). That lawyer

was Richard Cunninghan, to whom this article is dedicated.
163. Id. at 328.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 339.
166. Id.
167. Ken Armstrong & Steven Mills, Death Row Justice Derailed,CHI. TRIB.,
Nov. 14, 1999, § 1, at 1.
168. 665 N.E.2d 1319, 1320 (1996).
169. Id. at 1325.
170. Id. at 1325-26.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1326, 1327-29.
173. Burrows, 665 N.E.2d at 1329.
174. The last Illinois Supreme Court Opinion prior to dismissal is People v.
Porter,659 N.E.2d 915 (Ill. 1995).
175. Id. at 916-20.
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Alstory Simon was the real killer.17 The defendant's petition was
denied.1"
At a subsequent clemency hearing, a defense
psychologist testified that Porter had an I.Q. of 52. Thereafter, his
attorney filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Cook County
alleging that Porter was mentally unfit to be executed under the
authority of Ford v. Wainwright.7 ' The Capital Litigation Division
of the State Appellate Defender Office was appointed to the case.
While his lawyers prepared for the fitness hearing, Northwestern
University journalism students under the tutelage of Professor
Protess, found Alstory Simon in Milwaukee and convinced him to
confess. At a subsequent hearing in circuit court, the murder
conviction and death sentence were dismissed upon a joint motion
of the State and Defense.
The case of Hubert Geralds is another example, of a person to
be released from death row in Illinois after it was discovered that
he was absolutely innocent. According to the police, Geralds
confessed to the murder of Rhonda King, age 24. According to his
confession, they smoked crack cocaine together and then he
strangled her. She was found dead in a south side attic in 1994.
However, on January 31, 2000, another man, Andre Crawford,
confessed to that murder along with the murders of nine other
women and the sexual assault of a tenth woman. To the State's
Attorney's credit, when this information surfaced, the State moved
to vacate both the conviction and death penalty of Hubert Geralds.
He still faces charges on five other murders.
D. JudicialError
1. Legal Background
The Judge has responsibility to oversee the trial, rule on the
admissibility of evidence and insure that the defendant receives a
fair trial. In a death penalty case, the court must be especially
careful to insure a fair voir dire, where one of the issues is
determining those jurors who may be excluded from serving on the
jury due to their inability to impose the death penalty."7 ' In
addition, the court must also insure exclusion of jurors if they
would automatically impose the death penalty on a finding of
guilt.'s The trial court must also instruct the jury properly, and
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).

179. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, (1968); Wainwright v. Witt,
469 U.S. 412 (207); but see People v. Seuffer, 582 N.E.2d 71 (Ill. 1991)
(excluding for cause a potential juror who first stated that he was opposed to
the death penalty, but stated unequivocally that his views would not prevent
him from considering it in the appropriate case).
180. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 725 (1992) (reversing a trial Judge
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preside over a proceeding where the final outcome will determine
the ultimate judgment on life or death. In a number of cases the
Illinois Supreme Court has found error in those proceedings, or
has simply reduced a death sentence to life.18
2. Wrongful Sentencing
The Illinois Supreme Court has not hesitated to reverse the
death penalty where it was wrongfully imposed under Illinois law.
Examples of these cases include: People v. Lucas, where the death
penalty imposed for the murder of a child under age of 12 was
erroneously imposed, since the State did not prove the
requirement that it "resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous
behavior indicative of wanton cruelty";82 People v. Reid, where the
only statutory aggravating factor alleged, murder in the course of
a home invasion, was not proven by the State; 8. People v. Scott
Kellick, the defendant was found to qualify for the death penalty
under the wrong statute which fixed death as the penalty for

who refused to ask whether a prospective juror would automatically impose
the death penalty on a finding of guilty). See also People v. Smith, No. 86775,
2000 WL 1763261 (Ill. Dec. 1, 2000) (where the trial court judge refused to ask
jurors whether they would automatically vote for death in every murder case);
accord People v. Lewis, 651 N.E.2d 72, 80-82 (Ill. 1995); People v. Johnson,
636 N.E.2d 485, 491 (Ill. 1994); and People v. Cloutier, 732 N.E.2d 519, 527
(2000).
181. See, e.g. People v. Gleckler, 411 N.E.2d 849, 861 (1980) (affirming the
defendant's convictions for two murders, but vacating his death sentence and
remanding the case for the imposition of a sentence other than death). The
Supreme Court relied upon its assessment that defendant, "with no criminal
history, the personality of a doormat, and a problem with alcohol, was not the
ringleader in this sordid affair; nor are his rehabilitative prospects
demonstrably poorer than [his co-defendants] who received imprisonment
terms." Id. See also People v. Smith, 685 N.E.2d 880, 901 (Ill. 1997) (holding
the death penalty excessive in a case where a woman hired a co-defendant to
kill her boyfriend's wife, where there was significant mitigating evidence and
great potential for rehabilitation); People v. Leger, 597 N.E.2d 586, 611-13 (Ill.
1992) (finding the death sentence was excessive because the crimes were a
product of the defendant's marital, emotional, and drinking problems). In
addition, there was mitigating evidence of excellent military and work records,
serious medical problems, and lack of any significant criminal history. Id. See
also People v. Johnson, 538 N.E.2d 1118, 1131 (Ill. 1989) (holding the death
sentence was excessive given the Defendant's youth, family background,
employment history, lack of prior convictions, emotional problems, and
drug/alcohol dependency); People v. Buggs, 493 N.E.2d 332, 336-37 (Ill. 1986)
(finding that the death penalty was not warranted due to the Defendant's
military service, lack of prior criminal record, alcoholism, and marital
problems); People v. Carlson, 404 N.E.2d 233, 245 (1980) (holding that the
death sentence excessive in light of the fact that there was no prior history of
significant criminal activity, and the defendant acted under the influence of
extreme mental/emotional disturbance).
182. 548 N.E.2d 1003, 1023 (Ill. 1989).
183. 688 N.E.2d 1156, 1164 (Ill. 1997).

The John Marshall Law Review

[34:409

murder of a 15 year old, where the relevant statute for his case
was one that set victim's age at 12 or younger;18 4 People v. Taylor,
where the defendant was not qualified for the death penalty on the
murder charge after being acquitted on the armed robbery charge,
which would have been the aggravating factor; 85 People v. Tiller,
the defendant was not eligible for death based upon his
participation in armed robbery which resulted in two murders
which the Defendant neither planned nor carried out;86 People v.
Greer, the Defendant was not eligible for the death sentence under
the multiple murder eligibility factor due to the fact that a fetus is
not a "person" under Illinois law;187 People v. Simms, the
Defendant was not eligible for death where the state relied on a
nonexistent eligibility factor at that time (murder during course of
residential burglary);"' People v. Hayes, the death sentence relied
on the improper and irrelevant aggravating factor that victim was
just leaving church services;189 People v. Brownell, the death
sentence relied on the "killing of an eyewitness" as the eligibility
factor where the crime witnessed and the murder for which death
was imposed were part of the same, contemporaneous incident.'
3. Inadequate Review
Nor should the court be in a rush to dismiss post-conviction
proceedings where the parties have not completed their
investigation and preparation. In several cases the Illinois
Supreme Court has made it clear that judges who act too hastily to
dismiss post-conviction petitions will be reversed. For example, in
People v. Kitchen, the defendant was convicted of murder and
sentenced to death for setting a building on fire that killed five
members of a family.'
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the
case, but the defendant filed for post-conviction relief.1 2 The circuit
court specifically allowed continuance dates for hearings on the
progress of the discovery, which had been requested to support
defendant's post-conviction petition. 8 ' Although the State had not
yet filed a motion to dismiss the defendant's post conviction
petition, when defense counsel appeared in court for a discovery
status date, the circuit court dismissed the petition without a
hearing. 8 Kitchen appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court, which
184. 464 N.E.2d 1037, 1043-45 (Ill. 1984).
185. 463 N.E.2d 705, 714 (Ill. 1984).
186. 447 N.E.2d 174, 185 (Ill. 1982).
187. 402 N.E.2d 203, 209 (Ill. 1980).

188. 572 N.E.2d 947, 953 (Ill. 1991).
189. 564 N.E.2d 947, 953 (Ill. 1990).
190. 404 N.E.2d 181, 195 (Ill. 1980).

191.
192.
193.
194.

727 N.E.2d 189, 190 (Ill. 1999).
Id. at 190-91.
Id. at 191.
Id. at 192.
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vacated the circuit court's order denying relief, and remanded for
further proceedings in post-conviction.195
Similarly, in the case of Frank Bounds, he was convicted of
murder and criminal sexual assault and sentenced to death.'96 The
Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, and the defendant filed a post
conviction petition in circuit court. 19 7 The circuit court did not set a
date for hearing on the State's motion to dismiss, and continued
the case for resolution of discovery issues.
On a date set for
discovery matters the circuit court, with no prior notice to
defendant, dismissed the petition.' On appeal of the dismissal of
the post-conviction petition, the Illinois Supreme Court found that
defendant was denied due process when the lower court dismissed
the post-conviction petition on a date set for status.2 0°
It would seem elementary that at the very least a court must
listen to evidence of the defendant's mental health and family
background in a death penalty case, however that did not occur in
People v. Thompkins. 0 Thompkins was convicted of the murder of
two people and sentenced to death in Cook County."'2 The Illinois
Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence.0 3
Thereafter, he filed for post-conviction relief.2 4 The circuit court
dismissed the petition without a hearing. The Illinois Supreme
Court affirmed the lower court's action except for the claim of
200
ineffective counsel at sentencing. With respect to that claim, the
court remanded the case back to the circuit court for an
evidentiary hearing.0 9

At that evidentiary hearing the Circuit Judge denied the
defendant's request to call as witnesses a psychologist, an art
therapist, a criminal defense trial expert, and a clinical social

195. Id. at 195.
196. People v. Bounds, 694 N.E.2d 560, 560 (Ill. 1998). See also People v.

Hooper, 665 N.E.2d 1190 (Ill. 1996). Hooper was charged with the murder of
three people, armed robbery, and kidnapping.

Id. at 1191. After conviction

and sentences to death, the defendant filed for post-conviction relief. Id. The
petition was dismissed by the circuit court before a proper amended petition
could be filed. Id. at 1191-92. On appeal from dismissal of the Post-Conviction
petition, the Illinois Supreme Court issued a one page unpublished opinion

remanding the case back to the circuit court in light of its prior decision in
People v. Bounds.
197. Bounds, 694 N.E.2d at 560.

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 562.
690 N.E.2d 984 (Ill. 1998).
Id. at 986.
Id.
Id.
Id.

206. Thompkins, 690 N.E.2d at 986.
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worker." 7 He allowed the social worker to testify as a "fact
witness."2 8 He also denied all requests for offers of proof for these
witnesses."' He did allow the offer of proof for the testimony of
defendant's appellate counsel on direct appeal, but left the bench
and went into his chambers, rather than listen to the offer of
proof. 1'
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the cumulative effect of
these actions constituted an abuse of discretion by the postconviction hearing Judge, and remanded the case back to the
circuit court to reopen the evidentiary hearing. "
4. Jury Selection

Other areas where capital cases have been reversed at least
in part due to judicial error are those relating to jury selection,
instructions, etc. For example, in People v. Kuntu, the jury
foreman's personal acquaintanceship with the state's attorney was
not revealed during jury selection, and the post conviction judge
took no action when it was brought to his attention."' The Illinois
Supreme Court reversed for an evidentiary hearing on the issue.21
In another case, People v. Hope, the Circuit Court refused to
question prospective jurors prior to the sentencing hearing about
racial bias, even though the defendant was an African American
who pled guilty to the murder of a white police officer."1
Thereafter, the Illinois Supreme Court vacated the death sentence,
and remanded the case for a new capital sentencing hearing."'
5. Bias

Consistent with the court's obligation to insure as far as
possible a fair trial, especially in a death penalty case, is the
court's responsibility to be like Ceasar's wife, Calpurnia, and avoid
207. Id. at 987
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 988.
211. Thompkins, 690 N.E.2d at 995. That reopened hearing was held before
another Circuit Judge, and her findings were submitted to the Illinois
Supreme Court. On June 15th, 2000, the Illinois Supreme Court vacated the
death sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. People v.
Thompkins, 732 N.E.2d 553, 573 (Ill. 2000).
212. 720 N.E.2d 1047, 1048 (Ill. 1999).
213. Id. at 1049.
214. 702 N.E.2d 1282, 1284 (Ill. 1998). See also People v. Daniels, 665
N.E.2d 1221, 1227 (Ill. 1996) (holding that denying a capital defendant the
proper number of preemptory challenges warranted a new trial); People v.
Ramey, 603 N.E.2d 519, 538-39, 546 (vacating a death sentence because the
lower court refused to instruct the jury that they must find that the defendant
acted with intent to kill or knew of a strong probability of death or great bodily
harm in order to qualify for the death penalty).
215. Hope, 702 N.E.2d at 1289.
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even the perception of bias. When reviewing courts were made
aware of possible bias or bribes in capital cases, the courts acted. A
case on point is the matter of Fields and Hawkins. " ' In that case,
Hawkins, Fields, and a co-defendant (Carter) were charged with
the murders of two people.2" Hawkins and Fields were tried
together. " ' The court, who also found them eligible for death,
found them guilty." 8 A jury then sentenced them to death.' The
Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, and the defendants filed for postconviction relief in the Circuit Court of Cook County. " The circuit
court heard evidence that the trial Judge (Maloney) had accepted a
bribe of $10,000 in their case, and then returned it when he feared
that the FBI was watching him.2 The circuit court then vacated
their convictions and death sentences.2 2 The State appealed, but
the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the circuit
court.

2

In another case presided over by Judge Maloney of the Circuit
Court of Cook County, the matter was remanded by order of the
United States Supreme Court for further discovery. 25 William
Bracy and Roger Collins were convicted of aggravated kidnapping
and multiple murders in the course of an armed robbery in a jury
trial.226 The defendants pointed out that Judge Maloney had been
convicted of taking bribes in criminal cases within months (both
before and after) their trial, resulting in the acquittal of those
They argued that Judge Maloney insured
defendants.2 7
convictions and the harshest sentences for non-paying defendants
as part of his cover-up.228 Initially denied relief by Illinois courts
and the lower federal courts, the United States Supreme Court
granted review and remanded the case for further discovery.22
The federal district court then granted relief with respect to the
claim of judicial bias in the sentencing phase, and ordered a new
sentencing hearing.2 0

216. People v. Hawkins, 690 N.E.2d 999 (Ill. 1998).
217. Id. at 1000.
218. Id. at 1001.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1000
221. People v. Fields, 552 N.E.2d 791, 791 (Ill. 1990).
222. Hawkins, 690 N.E.2d at 1001.
223. Id. at 1002.
224. Id. at 1003.
225. United States v. Collins, 49 F. Supp. 2d 597, 605 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
226. Id. at 598.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 599.
230. Collins, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 599. The case is currently on appeal in the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
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6. EvidentiaryRulings
Another common error made by Illinois judges in death
penalty cases was in the admissibility of evidence. In the case of
Rolando Cruz, the trial court's decision almost sent an innocent
man to his death. After the defendant was convicted of murder and
sentenced to death, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed his
conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.13' The court held
that the trial court had erred by excluding evidence corroborating
that another man, Dugan, whose confession to this crime was
admitted into evidence, had committed a series of similar crimes.232
The Illinois Supreme Court also held that the trial court should
have excluded evidence that bloodhounds called to the crime scene
had followed a certain trail, evidence which was used by the
prosecution in closing argument to attack Dugan's confession.2 3
In People v. Anderson, after the defendant had been convicted
of murder and sentenced to death, his conviction was reversed and
the case remanded for a new trial. 2 4 The Illinois Supreme Court
found that the trial court had erred by admitting evidence that the
defendant was silent after receiving his Mirandawarnings, and by
excluding hearsay evidence which the defendant's expert
psychiatric witness had relied upon in arriving at his conclusion
that the defendant was insane.235 As a result of the decision in this
case, forensic experts could refer to findings made by social
workers or reports that were not in evidence, but which would
normally be used by psychiatrists and other experts in reaching
their ultimate diagnoses.236 On remand, the defendant received a
non-death sentence.2 7
Additional capital cases where relief was granted due to
judicial error in admitting or denying certain evidence include
People v. Wilson, where the defendant had been found guilty of
murder and sentenced to death, but, the Illinois Supreme Court
reversed the defendant's conviction and remanded for a new
231. People v. Cruz, 643 N.E.2d 636, 639 (Ill. 1994).
232. Id. at 655.
233. Id. at 662. The defendant was eventually found not guilty of all charges

and exonerated.
234. 495 N.E.2d 485, 490 (Ill. 1986).

235. Id. at 488-89
236. Id.
237. See also People v. Melock, 599 N.E.2d 941, 941 (Ill. 1992) (excluding
evidence of circumstances surrounding a polygraph exam); People v. House,
566 N.E.2d 259 (Ill. 1990) (where the Court excluded a spontaneous

declaration by the victim which described assailants in way which did not
match the defendant; the Judge also excluded a statement by a third party
admitting involvement in the murder and exculpating the Defendant); and
People v. Mahaffey, 651 N.E.2d 174 (1995) (where the Court erroneously
admitted the co-defendant's statement into evidence against the defendant at
their joint trial).
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trial. 238 The Illinois Supreme Court found that the trial court erred

by failing to suppress the defendant's statement after it was
shown that the defendant had been injured while in police
custody.3 9 He charged that he was shocked with electric wires,
smothered with a plastic bag, burned against a hot radiator, and
repeatedly punched and kicked." ° On remand, the defendant
received a non-death sentence.241
7. Clemency
In People v. Garcia,the Governor granted her clemency after
the Illinois Supreme Court had upheld her conviction and
sentence. 2 Ms. Garcia had been released from the Department of
Corrections after serving 10 years of a 20-year sentence for the
murder of her 11-month-old daughter and four aggravated
arsons.4 2 Shortly after her release, she married George, 26 years
238. 506 N.E.2d 571, 581 (Ill. 1987).
239. Id. at 574-577.
240. Id. See also Steven Mills & Ken Armstrong, A Tortured Path to Death
Row, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 17, 1999, § 1, at 1.
241. See also People v. Jones, 541 N.E.2d 132 (Ill. 1989) (admitting hearsay
statements and failing to give a jury instruction concerning circumstantial
evidence); People v. Lampkin, 550 N.E.2d 278 (Ill. 1990) (admitting blood
evidence against the defendant, but not telling the jury that blood was later
found not to match that of the defendant); People v. Cobb, 455 N.E.2d 31 (Ill.
1983) (excluding evidence that the State's main witness told another person
she hoped to get a reward for her testimony, and refusing to give the jury a
cautionary accomplice instruction concerning the State's main witness); People
v. Hill, 401 N.E.2d 517 (Ill. 1980) (holding that the defendant could not be
sentenced to death for murders which took place before the post-Furman
death penalty statute); People v. Davis, 220 N.E.2d 222 (Ill. 1966) (refusing to
consider the defendant's good behavior in jail as a mitigating factor); People v.
Boclair, 544 N.E.2d 715 (Ill. 1989) (refusing to consider psychiatric evidence
that the defendant suffered from a paranoid personality disorder); People v.
Rogers, 528 N.E.2d 667 (Ill. 1988) (admitting, at the second phase of his death
penalty hearing, the tape-recorded statements of the co-defendants, which
blamed the defendant for the crime); People v. Turner, 539 N.E.2d 1196 (Ill.
1989) (allowing the confession of one of the co-defendants that implicated
Turner to be heard by the jury in sentencing phase); People v. Williams, 563
N.E.2d 385 (Ill. 1990) (improperly reopening a motion to quash and suppress
after it had already been litigated by a prior judge); People v. Manning, 695
N.E.2d 423 (Ill. 1998) (improperly admitting evidence that the defendant and
a jailhouse informant discussed other crimes unrelated to the charged murder
because discussions of the murder did not appear on the tape obtained by the
jailhouse informant, who later received a reduction in his sentence from 14
years to six; and improperly admitting testimony that the victim told his wife
before disappearance to tell the FBI that the defendant killed him, if he dies);
and Gaines v. Thieret, 846 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that the judge
erred when he admitted hearsay evidence that the defendant's brother had
implicated him).
242. Unpublished decision of Governor James Edgar granting clemency. See
generally, People v. Garcia, 651 N.E.2d 100 (Ill. 1995).
243. Id. at 103
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her senior, for the second time. " The defendant had first met
George while she was a teenage prostitute years earlier."' The
defendant lived with George for several weeks before leaving him
and moving in with her grandparents.24 Four months later, the
defendant and her new boyfriend were looking for money, so the
defendant had her boyfriend drive her to her husband's apartment
building. 7 Upon seeing her husband in the parking lot, the
defendant grabbed her boyfriend's .357 magnum pistol and forced
her husband into his pickup truck.2 ' An argument immediately
ensued, and there was a struggle over the gun.2 ' The defendant
shot her husband at point blank range once in the chest."' He fell
to the pavement and bled to death.'
Before leaving the scene, the
defendant took the keys to her husband's truck. 22 She told her
boyfriend, "that mf- deserves to die." ' When later questioned
by police, the defendant stated that she wanted to get the person
responsible for her husband's death and told police she believed
her boyfriend was the killer. 2 ' The defendant ultimately confessed
to her husband's murder."'
The evidence showed that during childhood and adolescence,
the defendant had experienced at least three closed head injuries,
one requiring hospitalization."'
A psychiatric examination
revealed that she had suffered "many traumatic experiences" in
her life. 2 7 While a teenager on probation for prostitution, the
defendant had murdered her infant daughter by suffocating her
because she was frustrated over a custody dispute involving the
child.2 2 At the age of 19, the defendant and an accomplice tied up,
pistol whipped, and robbed her first ex-husband and his
girlfriend.2 ' Two years later, the defendant set fires on the
anniversaries of her daughter's birth and death."2 Evidence also
showed that the defendant had been sexually abused for a period
of years as a child. 6' She suffered from a borderline personality
244. Id.
245. Id.

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id.
Garcia,651 N.E.2d at 103.
Id. at 103-04.
Id. at 104.
Id.

251. Id.
252. Garcia, 651 N.E.2d at 103.

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 115.
Garcia, 651 N.E.2d at 115.
Id. at 112.
Id. at 113.
Id.
Id.
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disorder with sociopathic features, chronic depression and
alcoholism.282 The defendant had been drinking on the day of her
husband's murder and was drunk both before and after the
crime.282 Jail guards testified that the defendant was made a
trustee based on her exemplary behavior.284 They described the
defendant as a model inmate who had voluntarily cleaned sores
found on new inmates who were formerly homeless persons.28
By a 5-2 vote, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the
defendant's death sentence. 68 The court concluded that the
defendant's "checkered criminal history," including the prior
murder of her daughter, the robbery of her ex-husband, and four
aggravated arson convictions, outweighed any mitigation
regarding her history of sexual abuse as a child or her good
behavior in prison.2

7

Governor Edgar, however, granted the

defendant executive clemency, reducing her sentence to natural
life imprisonment without parole. 68
E. Fitness to Stand Trial & Other Mental Health Issues
1.

Legal Background

One of the most difficult problems facing Illinois courts has
been the question of whether a defendant is fit to stand trial, fit to
pursue his post-conviction remedies, or to waive his rights and be
executed. Several of these cases involved capital defendants, each
one of which was unique. In Pate v. Robinson, the Illinois
Supreme Court held that a judge has a duty to hold a hearing if he
has a bona fide doubt that the defendant may not be competent to
understand the nature of the charge against him or cooperate with
his lawyer.289
2. Illinois Cases

In the case of Robin Wayne Owens, he was convicted of armed
robbery and murder in the Circuit Court of Will County, and
sentenced to death. 7 ° On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court
affirmed his conviction and sentence. " Thereafter, defendant

262. Garcia,651 N.E.2d at 113.

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Id. at 116.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 114.
Garcia,651 N.E.2d at 113.
See Ray Long, Edgar Commutes Death Sentence of Condemned Woman
at
19,
2001)
available
(visited
Feb.
http://www.soci.niu.edu/-critcrim/dp/dpill/dpgarcia. commute.
269. 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966).
1990).
270. People v. Owens, 564 N.E.2d 1184, 1185 (Ill.
1984).
271. See generally People v. Owens, 464 N.E.2d 252 (Ill.
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filed a petition for post-conviction relief. 72 The Will County Public
Defender was appointed, and filed a motion for appointment of an
expert to determine the defendant's fitness to assist counsel at the
post-conviction stage.272 He stated that he had reports detailing
defendant's bizarre behavior and treatment with anti-psychotic
drugs by the Department of Corrections.27'
The circuit court denied the petition, and the Illinois Supreme
Court reversed, holding that Supreme Court Rule 651(c) could not
be satisfied where a defendant could not communicate with
appointed counsel to shape his claims of constitutional
deprivation.7
The Illinois Supreme Court remanded the case to
the trial court to determine if there was a bona fide doubt of
defendant's fitness to participate in the post-conviction
procedure.276
Another major case which has been a problem for Illinois
courts, prosecutors, and defense counsel is People v. St. Pierre,
where the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the trial court on direct
appeal for admitting a statement which should have been
suppressed because the defendant unambiguously. asked for
counsel. 7' However, thereafter the defendant plead guilty, then
filed post-conviction proceedings, but then waived all of his postconviction rights.278
He then changed his mind, and after
remanding the matter back to the circuit court for a fitness
hearing, the Illinois Supreme Court accepted his waiver.279
However, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, noting
that St. Pierre (who suffers from Bi-Polar Disorder) changed his
mind the next day and wanted to proceed on post conviction.280
Currently, the case is back in the Federal District Court-for the
Northern District of Illinois.281
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
There have been a number of commissions, task forces, and
committees formed to look into the problems of Illinois criminal
justice system as exemplified by the discovery of 13 men released
from Death Row because of actual innocence since the United

272. Owens, 564 N.E.2d at 1185.
273. Id. at 1186.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 1187.
276. Id. at 1191. Robin Wayne Owens was declared unfit, and until this day
sits on death row in Illinois Prison, until he can recover sufficiently to assist
his counsel in post-conviction proceedings.
277. 522 N.E.2d 61, 69 (Ill. 1988).
278. People v. St. Pierre, 588.N.E.2d 1159, 1161 (Ill. 1992).
279. Id. at 1165
280. St. Pierre v. Cowan, 217 F.3d 939, 944 (7th Cir. 2000).
281. Id. at 951.
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States Supreme Court reinstated the death penalty in 1976.2" The
Tribune, in a series of articles by Ken Armstrong and Steve Mills,
found that of 285 death penalty cases since 1977, in 33 cases a
defendant sentenced to death was represented at trial by a lawyer
who was disbarred or his license suspended, in 35 cases the jury
that sentenced a black defendant was entirely white, and in 46
cases, a jailhouse informant was used by the prosecution, a
practice that has come under suspicion recently in several states
for its unreliability.28
Our analysis has revealed problems with defense lawyers,
prosecutors, and the Judiciary. There is no one reason for the
recent failure of our criminal justice system. The problem is
system-wide. In a proper functioning system, the innocent are
weeded out by the police, or the prosecutor, or the court, so that by
the time a defendant survives preliminary hearing or indictment,
and the State seeks the death penalty in a capital felony
proceeding, the chances of innocence should be remote, but they
are not in Illinois. Moreover, in a capital case when the most
experienced prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges should be
involved, the kinds of errors we have documented should not take
place in a proper functioning system. But, they have taken place
in Illinois. The Tribune reporters found that more than 10% of
Illinois death penalty cases were reversed for a new trial or
sentencing because of prosecutorial misconduct."
As we have
noted at the outset of this article, Illinois is not alone in this
problem. Mills and Armstrong reported that nationwide 381
defendants had their homicide convictions reversed due to
prosecutors concealing evidence or knowingly using false
evidence. 85 All in all the Tribune estimates that as many as 49%
of death penalty cases have resulted in new trials or sentencing
hearings due to the combined errors of prosecutor, court, and
defense counsel. 86
The problem will not be solved unless there are massive
efforts to change the thinking of some of the main actors in the
criminal justice system, and to change some of the methods
utilized by the police and prosecution, to provide the training
needed to arrest and process cases in accordance with due process
standards. A change in attitude by the police such as training to
insure that all arguable suspects are investigated in a case,
instead of concentration by the police on a single suspect is an
example. Police torture must be absolutely rejected by local and
state governments, and if it is proven in a given case that it
282. Armstrong & Mills, supra note 167, § 1, at 1.
283. Id.

284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
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The
occurred, it must be acknowledged and not hidden.
suggestions that confessions ought to be videotaped should not be
resisted by the police or the prosecution since it would go a long
way to insure that confessions such as those obtained from Hubert
Geralds or Ronald Jones would not take place. Additionally, not
only must the police honor the warrant process in search and
arrest situations, but they must honor International treaties such
as the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, which requires
the police to notify arrested foreign nationals of their right to call
their consulates or embassies prior to making a statement.287
Prosecutors, judges, and defense lawyers must also meet
Supreme Court and Bar Association standards for the prosecution
and defense of capital cases. Recently, the Special Supreme Court
Committee on Capital Cases recommended that all assistant
state's attorneys and defense counsel who handle capital cases be
required to meet specified experience standards. The American
Bar Association and the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association both recommended that two defense lawyers be
assigned to each capital case, and that lead counsel have prior
experience in death penalty litigation as well as specialized legal
training in capital litigation. 88 In January, 2001 the Illinois
Supreme Court approved these recommendations and authorized
the creation of a capital litigation trial bar which would implement
these minimum standards.
Currently in Illinois, most capital litigation at the trial level is
handled by public defenders or appointed counsel. At the Appellate
level, death penalty cases are represented by the Supreme Court
Unit of the Illinois State Appellate Defender Office or the Cook
County Public Defender Appeals Division.
In Capital Post
Conviction cases, the Capital Litigation Division of the State
Appellate Defender Office is appointed by the Illinois Supreme Court
or County Circuit Courts.
That office utilizes a panel of
approximately 120 lawyers, including lawyers from almost all of the
major firms in Chicago, who work pro bono. The other lawyers on the
panel, including former public defenders, private criminal defense
lawyers, and former prosecutors work for a small hourly fee, as
compared with the prevailing rates for lawyers in Illinois. The office
provides investigative, social work, and legal support to the panel
lawyers.
287. The fact that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has just held that
failure of the police to notify foreign nationals of their consular rights under
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention does not result in the suppression of a
confession made to the police under such circumstances, does not help our
image abroad as an honorable nation that keeps its promises when it signs
treaties. See United States v. Lawal, 231 F.3d 1045, 1048-49 (7th Cir. 2000).
288. Standards for the Appointment of Counsel in CapitalCases, (Nat'l Legal
Aid and Defender Ass'n, Washington, D.C. 1988) (Source on file with author).
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In addition, in 1999, the Illinois Legislature allocated
$17,000,000 for improvements in capital prosecution and defense.
The Illinois State Appellate Defender established a Death Penalty
Trial Assistance Division, which would provide lawyers to second
chair death penalty cases outside of Cook County, and also provide
criminal investigators and social workers. It also will sponsor a
series of training seminars for lawyers, investigators, and social
workers that deal with capital defendants.
The Legislature also established a capital trust fund to pay
appointed counsel in capital cases from state funds.
The Task Force on Professional Practice in the Illinois Justice
System has also recommended that the State create a fund, similar
to the Capital Trust Fund to provide funds to ensure necessary
expert witnesses for the indigent and partially indigent. This
suggestion by the Task Force would be an excellent way to ensure
that cases like Samuel Morgan and others like his are diagnosed at
the trial level so that the sentencing judge can have that
information, instead of waiting for expert examination at the post
conviction stage.
Defense counsel in capital cases are for the most part paid by
the State. They must be paid adequately to attract the finest lawyers
in our profession and to retain them. As long as a Public Defender's
office is viewed as a place to train for three years before leaving for
private solo practice or a greater salary at a big law firm, the finest
talent in our legal system will not be available for these cases.
The Special Supreme Court Committee on Capital Cases also
recommended that the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct be
amended to state that the duty of a prosecutor is to seek justice,
not merely to convict.289 This would bring Illinois into conformity
with the American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal
Justice. In addition, the Committee proposed that prosecutors
make a good faith effort to specifically identify discovery material
favorable to the accused.29 ° That is certainly a step in the right
direction. It also suggested that discovery depositions be allowed
in capital cases at the discretion of the court. That suggestion
should be adopted as well so that we avoid "trial by ambush" in
Capital cases. Prosecutors now receive peer support when they win
death penalty cases. They must also receive peer support when they

289. See Illinois Supreme Court Rules, Article VIII, Illinois Rules of
Professional Conduct, Rule 3.8. Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor
(amended

March

1,

2001)

available

at

http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Rules/Art_VIIIArtVIII.htm#3.8.
On March 1st, 2001, the Illinois Supreme Court amended rule 3.8 to provide
that "[t]he duty of a public prosecutor or other government lawyer is to seek
justice, not merely to convict." Id. 3.8(a).
290. Aaron Chambers, Panel Eases Call for Evidence Disclosure, CHI. DAILY
LAW BULL., Nov. 1, 2000, at 3.
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turn over "Brady" material to the defense which assists the defense,
and when they make a principled decision not to ask for the death
penalty in every case.
The Illinois Supreme Court has also adopted the committee's
recommendation for specialized training for the Judiciary so that
judges would participate in capital case training at least once every
two years." The Judiciary must not be graded on how quickly they
dispose of a death penalty case at trial or post-conviction. The
Illinois Supreme Court is to be praised for their reversals of several
cases where the post conviction courts hastened dismissal of cases
before post conviction petitions could be fully perfected.
Another change that should be made in order to improve the
workings of the criminal justice system in Illinois is the abolition
of the use of the death penalty against mentally-retarded
defendants. Although in Penry v. Lynaugh, the United States
Supreme Court held that allowing the execution of the mentally
retarded was not unconstitutional, 92 thirteen states nevertheless
have passed legislation banning the execution of the mentally
retarded in their respective states.292
Apart from the moral and philosophical question of whether a
retarded person has the same comprehension as an average person
when he commits murder, there is a practical problem with the
representation of such a person. In the case of Hubert Geralds,
whose conviction and sentence was vacated only after another
291 See Illinois Supreme Court Rules, Article I, General Rules, Rule 43.

1, 2001) available at
(March
Capital Cases
Seminars on
On
http://www.state.il.us/court/ SupremeCourt/Rules/Art_I/ArtI.htm#43.
March 1st, 2001, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted Rule 43, that provides:
Rule 43. Seminars on Capital Cases
(a) In order to insure the highest degree of judicial competency during a

capital trial and sentencing hearing Capital Litigation Seminars
approved by the Supreme Court shall be established for judges that
may as part of their designated duties preside over capital litigation.
The Capital Litigation Seminars should include, but not be limited to,
the judge's role in capital cases, motion practice, current procedures in
jury selection, substantive and procedural death penalty case law,
confessions, and the admissibility of evidence in the areas of scientific
trace materials, genetics, and DNA analysis. Seminars on capital cases
shall be held twice a year.
(b) Any circuit court judge or associate judge who in his current
assignment may be called upon to preside over a capital case shall

attend a Capital Litigation Seminar at least once every two years.
Id.
292. 492 U.S. 302, 340

(1989).

On March 26, 2001, the United States

Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to revisit the specific issue of
whether the execution of the mentally retarded violates the cruel and unusual
punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment.

See McCarver v. North

Carolina, No. 00-8727, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 2690 (March 26, 2001).
293. See David G. Savage, A Second Opinion: Case of a Mentally Retarded
Murderer Comes Back to the Court 12 Years Later, 87 A.B.A. J. 33, 33 (2001).
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person confessed to the crime, one of his lawyers suggested
Geralds might well have been executed for a murder he did not
commit because his limited I.Q.294 prevented him from
communicating adequately with his lawyer. Nor could Anthony
Porter communicate adequately with his lawyer about his case.
His I.Q. was measured at anywhere from 51 to 76. Porter came
within two days of his execution before it was discovered that he
was absolutely innocent.
A bill to exempt the mentally retarded was introduced in the
Illinois State Legislature, but it was vetoed by former Governor
Thompson. However, that was before cases like Hubert Geralds'
and Anthony Porter's.
VI. CONCLUSION
Will these suggestions and others made by the various task
forces and commissions solve the problems of Illinois' criminal
justice system? Certainly, many of these recommendations will
help, but whether we can ever be assured that an innocent person
or a person who does not deserve the death penalty will not be
executed in our state, given the arbitrariness and race biases built
into the system, the frailty of human nature, the possibility of
human error, and our own unconscious biases, cannot be answered
positively with assurance.
There are many hurdles to overcome and consider. First of all,
suppose that all the actors in the system agree to these reforms,
what do we do about all the cases now in the system where capital
punishment has been imposed, should we vacate all of those death
sentences, knowing that they were imposed under a flawed system?
Even if we adopt all the reforms recommended by the various
commissions- is there any guarantee that a system allowing the
death penalty will work even then, or is there something inherently
corrupting that allows as an end the State to deliberately and with
moral certitude kill one of its citizens? Consider the fact that
Professor Liebman found a 68% error rate nationally in death
penalty cases as opposed to a 15% error rate in non-capital cases. It
is certainly a dilemma, both moral and practical. Liebman concluded
that "this much error and the time needed to cure it, impose terrible
costs on taxpayers, victims' families, the judicial system and the
And it renders unattainable the finality,
wrongly condemned.
retribution, and deterrence that are the reasons usually given for
having a death penalty."'95
There are those who believe that once reforms are instituted,
the system will work, and the abiding fear that a "wrongfully
convicted" person will be put to death in Illinois will be a spectre of
294. Geralds' I.Q. was estimated as that of an 8 year old.
295. See Liebman, supra note 14.

The John MarshallLaw Review

[34:409

the past. In order to be sure that this is true, the Illinois
Moratorium should be extended for a minimum of five years after all
reforms have gone into effect to determine whether the Judicial,
Prosecutorial, and defense counsel errors have been eliminated, and
whether the new system actually works.
Perhaps the parting words of United States Supreme Court
Justice Blackmun as he left the bench after 24 years of service are
the most eloquent and illuminating on this subject. He stated:
Perhaps one day this court will develop procedural rules or verbal
formulas that actually will provide consistency, fairness, and reliability
in a capital sentencing scheme. I am not optimistic, though, that such
a day will come. I am more optimistic though that this court eventually
will conclude that the ... death penalty must be abandoned altogether.
I may2not
9 live to see that day, but I have faith that eventually it will
arrive.

296. Callins v. Collins, 114 S.Ct. 1127, 1138 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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Relief in Illinois Capital Cases
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Error in Illinois Capital Cases
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